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Research has shown a positive correlation between extractive colonisation and low post-colonial 
economic growth.  This paper provides case study research to explore the possibility that post-
colonial extractive institutions were already present in pre-colonial times. In Zambia’s case this is 
indeed true. Extractive institutions existed in Zambia before colonisation, and colonisation certainly 
did not improve on them.  The question whether countries like Zambia are doomed for failure is also 
considered, and it is concluded that an environment that allows experimentation is supportive of 
economic  growth  and  development.  With  an  authoritative  regime  during  the  Second  Republic, 
feedback on policy decisions was limited and may provide more of an answer to bad post-colonial 
economic performance than extractive colonisation. 
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Institutions and Institutional Change in Zambia 
 
1. Introduction 
The detrimental influence of colonisation cannot be overstated. Research has shown that especially 
extractive colonisation displays a positive correlation with low post-colonial economic growth.  This 
type of colonisation, which is characterised by the infringement of property rights, created extractive 
institutions that were transplanted into the independent country. The question that is addressed in 
this paper, however, is whether there are any similarities between pre-colonial and post-colonial 
institutions in these countries. In other words, were the post-colonial extractive institutions only due 
to extractive colonisation, or were they already noticeable in the pre-colonial setting. 
 
2. Zambia as a case study 
To investigate this question, the paper focuses on the Zambian case study. Zambia was a British 
colony up to independence in 1964. There were no large settlements of Europeans during colonial 
rule and due to the fact that copper was extracted, institutions supporting these extractions were 
created.  
 
At independence Zambia had a per capita income of US$664, which was, to put it into context, 
almost  double  that  of  its  neighbour,  and  the  later  African  economic  star,  Botswana.  However, 
Zambia’s  subsequent  economic  performance  did  not  live  up  to  the  expectations  created  by  the 
relatively fortunate starting point. For the first 30 years after independence the Zambian economy 
shrunk on average by 1.0 percent per year in per capita terms.  
 
One explanation for this bad performance focuses on the detrimental influence of a declining copper 
price. Copper plays an important role in the Zambian economy and has dominated the economy 
since large-scale mining operations started in 1924. At independence in 1964, copper accounted for 
91 percent of total export earnings and since then the ratio has changed very little. The decline in the 
real copper price since the mid-1960s, therefore, seems to be a logical explanation for Zambia’s 
economic decline. Indeed, Zambia’s declining terms of trade, because of the falling real copper 
price, often features in explanations of Zambia’s economic decline (for example Neumayer 2004, 
Sachs and Warner 1995, Stevens 2003).  
 
Ndulo (1999) and Du Plessis and du Plessis (2006), among others, provide another explanation for 
the economic stagnation of Zambia. Their explanations focus on the post-colonial policies and their  
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detrimental consequences for the Zambian economy. They do not ignore the important influence of 
the copper price, but focus their attention on the political reaction to the declining terms of trade. 
This paper follows this line of argument, but takes a step further by asking the question: how are 
these  poor  policies  explained?  Was  it  due  to  extractive  colonisation,  or  were  these  extractive 
institutions prevalent in pre-colonial Zambia?  
 
To answer this question, the article explores certain aspects of the post- and pre-colonial institutional 
framework of Zambia. The aspects that are covered are those highlighted by the following definition 
of the institutional framework North (2005: 49) provides: “… [it] consists of the political structure 
that specifies the way we develop and aggregate political choices, the property rights structure that 
defines the formal economic incentives and the social structure – norms and conventions – that 
defines the informal incentives in the economy”.  The institutional framework is, therefore, the 
result of formal institutions together with previously accumulated norms and conventions of the 
society over time.  
 
The article therefore focuses on reasons why the post-colonial government infringed on property 
rights and identifies possible sources of human decision-making regarding property rights. It also 
investigates whether the informal institutions that supported the infringement could be attributed 
solely to Zambia’s colonial experience or whether it was already in the making in pre-colonial 
Zambia. 
 
2. Colonialism as an explanation for economic stagnation 
In the last number of years extensive research has been done on the link between colonisation and 
post-colonial economic prosperity. It is especially the work of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001, 2003, 2004) that have linked different types of colonisation to geographical realities, and 
these to post-colonial institutions. A study of former European colonies by Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001) reveals that the post-colonial institutions in almost all these former colonies were 
influenced by their colonial past. In particular those institutions that support private property by 
constraining local elites and rulers, were more likely to be created by European colonisers where 
they settled in large numbers (e.g. in the USA and Australia). 
 
In contrast, when the objective of colonisation was mainly resource extraction, as opposed to the 
founding of a new society, no participatory institutions emerged. The institutional framework in 
such colonies has been called “extractive" by Acemoglu et.al. (2001). For example, in colonies  
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where the climate (and the associated disease environment) was unfavourable to European health 
and  settlement,  they  did  not  have  the  incentive  to  settle  and  develop  economic  institutions 
supportive of the development of the economy in general. Extractive institutions served the purpose 
of  the  colonialists,  and  this  led  to  weak  institutions  (with  respect  to  property  rights)  post 
independence. A large literature associates such institutional weakness with low and volatile growth 
(see for instance, Acemoglu, et al. 2004, Easterly and Levine 2002, Knack and Keefer 1995, North 
1990, Rodrik 1999). 
  
This  account  appears  to  suggest  inevitable  decline  for  colonies  that  had  been  subjected  to  extractive 
colonisation. If this is the case, the prospects for Zambia look bleak. There were no large settlements of 
Europeans during colonial rule and due to the fact that copper was extracted, institutions supporting these 
extractions were created. It can be argued that Zambia inherited a system of extractive institutions that was 
transplanted  into  post-colonial  Zambia.  This  transplantation  can  be  explained  by  the  theory  of  path 
dependency. 
 
The above-mentioned theory explains how initial advantages or disadvantages and interim shocks can have 
long-lasting  effects on growth.  In  his latest  book, Douglass North  (2005)  explains  that humans  learn to 
understand their environment through the development of “mental constructs” derived from their experiences 
in the past and present. These mental constructs cause change to happen incrementally and are instrumental in 
how economies change over time. Even where formal institutions change rapidly, informal institutions, or 
culture, do not change at the same speed, but serve as a “memory” of things that happened in the past. Does 
this mean that a memory of extractive colonisation leads necessarily to low post-colonial growth? 
 
Fortunately for Zambia, and similar countries, there is no deterministic link between the past and the future, 
though path dependency links decision-making through time. Choices are constrained by path dependency, 
but they are still the outcome of human decisions. These choices are open to change or revision; a process 
that might often be slow but could be very rapid in other cases, for example a revolution.  
 
The importance of choice is demonstrated by the history of colonisation. The different types of colonialism 
and the institutions it created were the choice of the colonial powers. When the colonisers did not settle, they 
chose economic institutions designed simply to extract resources from the native population. When they 
settled in large numbers, economic institutions and policies emerged in order to protect them in the future and 
encourage  investment  and  prosperity.  These  actions  of  the  economic  and  political  agents,  although  not 
necessarily to the advantage of the indigenous population, were the result of choices made by the colonial 
powers.  Similarly,  post-colonial  political  elites  had  the  option  of  either  revisiting  or  protecting  the 
institutional framework they inherited at independence.  
 
These  choices  about  the  institutional  framework  are  influenced  by  a  combination  of  history,  informal  
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institutions and the pressure from interest groups that benefit from upholding or changing the old framework. 
On a more practical level, it is the desire of role players to strive towards an improvement of their position 
that brings about change.  
 
The  institutional  framework  influences  decision-making,  but  these  decisions  will  again  influence  the 
institutional  framework.  Therefore,  the  framework  is  never  static.  Whether  change  will  “improve”  the 
institutional framework, in the sense that it improves the environment for growth and development, depends 
on the intentions of the role players, how they perceive their environment and how they understand the issue 
at hand. Bad economic performance can thus be attributed to either players with intentions that are not to the 
advantage of the society at large, and/or players with an imperfect understanding of the issues: “to what 
degree our beliefs accord with ‘reality’” (North 2005: 5). These intentions, perceptions and understanding are 
all influenced by colonisation and surviving informal institutions. 
 
Extractive  colonisation  in  Zambia  strained  the  relationship  between  the  colonisers  and  the  colonised. 
Organised resistance preceded  independence,  with the leader  of the resistance,  and the first  president of 
independent Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, was even jailed for organising resistance. With relationships strained 
between the colonisers and the colonised, the post colonial government was also committed to end any form 
of domination from white southern Africa.  
 
One of the consequences of the efforts to break free of colonial influences was a loss of confidence due to the 
infringement on property rights. The next section focuses specifically on property rights.  
 
3. Property rights in Zambia 
As mentioned above, property rights are one of the building blocks of the institutional framework, and its 
importance derives from the central role of property rights in the process of specialisation and trade that 
accompanies economic development. If transaction costs are minimised and property rights protected, the 
cost  of  production  and  distribution  is  lower.  It  allows  private  agents  more  scope  to  benefit  from 
specialisation, investment and trade; the building blocks of economic growth. 
 
Zambia’s  colonisation  has  already  been  described  as  extractive,  with  the  all  important  copper 
industry  essentially  in  the  hands  of  foreign  businesses  at  independence.  This  resulted  in  a 
relationship between local Zambians and the foreign companies that was particularly strained.  
 
The Zambian public regarded the companies as insensitive to the needs of the country, for at least 
these reasons: firstly, these companies made no other investments during colonisation, other than 
those necessary to extract copper. Secondly, the mining industry had supported the Federation that 
preceded independence. And finally, many foreign companies operating in Zambia were subsidiaries  
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of multinationals also operating in Ian Smith’s Rhodesia and therefore seen as unsympathetic to the 
desire of Africans to rule themselves.  
 
The companies expected the protection of their property rights after independence. Stiglitz (2000: 
15)  finds  irony  in  such  expectations,  in  his  words  “…when  the  colonial  powers  granted 
independence to their former colonies they forgot the abrogation of (implicit) property rights that 
they perpetrated in the first place and strongly urged that the newly independent countries respect 
property rights (including those of white settlers)”. Not knowing exactly what to expect from the 
new government, the companies paid out most of their profits as dividends to their foreign owners, 
rather than invest in the Zambian operations.  
 
The  post-independence  situation,  therefore,  started  with  mutual  suspicion  between  the  Zambian 
government and the foreign companies. This made it difficult for the two parties to find a solution 
that was mutually beneficial.  
 
In an attempt to distance themselves from the colonial powers, a wave of nationalisations started in 
1968.  At  first  the  copper  industry  was  left  intact,  while  government  focused  on  the  broader 
economic  environment.  In  his  Mulungushi  speech  in  April  1968,  President  Kaunda  complained 
about the excessive expatriation of profits after independence. He proposed new reforms that would 
direct available capital to development and ensure that Zambians “individually and corporately share 
in the commercial and industrial life of the country” (quoted in Turok 1989: 42). Kaunda stated that 
new measures of state intervention were necessary because Zambians lacked the capital and skills to 
be economically active on their own. “Only the government of the people can participate on their 
behalf and ensure that the nation has control of the vital resources in the country, and also provides 
avenues for the acquisition of skills pertaining to economic development and participation” (quoted 
in Turok 1989: 42). The public sector was therefore assigned a leading role in development in 
independent Zambia.   
 
The Mulungushi Reforms permitted the government to acquire 51 percent shares in private retail, 
transport, and manufacturing firms through a parastatal, the Industrial Development Corporation 
(INDECO). The government bought out 24 large private companies that were mainly involved in 
production  and  distribution  throughout  the  country.  But  soon  the  government  realised  that 
manufacturing accounted for only 6 percent of the GDP; if they really wanted to influence the 
economy, they had to acquire control over the mining industry (Turok 1989).  
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Until 1969 the Zambian government adopted a laissez-faire policy towards the mining industry and 
disclaimed any intention of nationalising it. Nevertheless, according to Roberts (1976) the argument 
for some form of nationalisation became stronger over time. Since the country depended so heavily 
on the copper industry, the government was likely sooner or later to increase not only its share in 
mining profits, but also in shaping mining policy.  
 
The private companies had long foreseen that the government would wish to become involved in the 
ownership of the industry. They did not, however, expect the full nationalisation of the mines. They 
acknowledged the suggestion of the 1964 United Nations mission that the government take a large 
minority shareholding in exchange for abolishing royalties altogether and for undertaking to limit 
taxes and not to nationalise the mines (Cunningham 1981). 
 
However, this was to no avail as President Kaunda set about nationalising the copper industry in 
1969. The first step was a referendum that gave the government the right to change the clause in the 
constitution that  had previously prevented  them from  acquiring private property by compulsory 
order.  The  outcome  of  this  referendum  encouraged  Kaunda  to  announce  major  changes  in  the 
sharing of Zambia’s copper wealth. Secondly, government appropriated all mining rights in the 
country. The Mines and Mineral Act of 1969 provided for the reversion of all mineral rights to the 
President on behalf of the State (Pettman 1974). Thirdly, the Matero Reforms of 1969 resulted in the 
government purchasing 51 percent shares in the mining companies, Anglo American Corporation 
and Roan Selection Trust, leading to partial nationalisation of the copper industry. The government 
had no wish, at first, to run the mines itself and undertook to pay the companies for continuing 
management and services (Obidegwu and Nziramasanga 1981, Roberts 1976). 
 
Although the government paid for taking over ownership of the mines, it did this without any prior 
consultation with the mining companies’ executives. This could be attributed to strong political 
pressures within the country at the time, believing that the foreign-owned mining companies were 
one of the last vestiges of colonialism, and that one of the controlling interests, the Anglo-American 
Corporation, was a South African company. According to Cunningham (1981: 270-271):  
The  president  would  probably  have  run  into  considerable  political  difficulties  if  the 
nationalisation had appeared to result from some gentleman’s agreement with the private 
owners. The political situation demanded that nationalisation appear to the Zambian voter as 
a unilateral action taken by a proud and sovereign nation to break the bonds of colonialism 
and foreign capitalism.  
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Yet, despite all the internal pressure, President Kaunda negotiated a deal that was accepted by his 
own people and also, reluctantly, by the private owners - a considerable achievement if one takes 
into account the differences in expectations they had at independence. Cunningham (1981) proposes 
that of the various nationalisations of mining properties in Africa and in Latin America during the 
1960s  and  early  1970s,  the  Zambian  case  was  perhaps  the  most  advantageous  to  the  private 
shareholders. The government arranged to pay for its share out of its dividends over a number of 
years. 
 
The take-over had its advantages and disadvantages from the point of view of the mining companies. 
To the industry it seemed clear that the new partnership was a transitional arrangement to help 
Zambia avoid a costly disruption of its mining operations, therefore their primary interest remained 
the maximisation of short-run profits and high-dividend payments. The companies realised that high 
level  investments  would  decrease  dividends,  since  the  majority  owner,  the  government,  would 
favour financing investment out of profits. Therefore, the companies decreased their investments 
and  rather  paid  out  the  profits  as  dividends.  One  of  the  most  important  South  African  mining 
magnates,  HF  Oppenheimer,  remarked  that  the  only  real  advantage  of  the  partnership  with  the 
Zambian government for the mining companies, was that the compensation payments provided the 
companies with liquid funds that enabled them to broaden their field of operations elsewhere (Gann 
1986). 
 
At Zambia’s independence, the industry was run by two high quality and internationally respected 
organisations  that  used  retained  profits  to  expand  production  and  capacity  continually  and 
profitably.  Alternatively,  the  objective  of  the  Zambian  government  was  different.  Government 
planned to use operating profits to help fulfil its own objectives of promoting, amongst others, 
employment opportunities, foreign exchange earnings and the development of rural areas (Burdette 
1988).  
 
During  the  “last  stage”  of  Zambianisation  announced  in  November  1970,  the  government 
appropriated a 51 percent share in the private banks and in five foreign companies. With this step the 
involvement of the government went well beyond the copper industry. It took over the building 
societies and closed down all insurance companies—with one exception, the state owned insurer. 
The  four  foreign  owned  commercial  banks  had  been  under  attack  for  applying  conventional 
commercial standards,  purportedly  discriminating  against  Zambian  borrowers  trying  to  establish 
their  own  businesses  (only  20  to  25  percent  of  total  credit  went  to  the  Zambian  sector  of  the 
economy). To overcome this politically unacceptable situation a state-owned National Commercial  
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Bank was established in October 1969 to provide extended credit facilities for Zambians (Pettman 
1974).  
 
To  strengthen  its  perceived  control  over  the  mining  industry,  the  government  also  decided  to 
terminate all contracts for services with foreign mining companies in 1973. It further decided to 
redeem all government bonds, despite the penalty of US$55 million. At that stage the government 
had to borrow US$ 150 million on the Eurodollar market to finance these transactions, which all 
took  place  under  the  euphoria  that  the  income  from  the  copper  industry  would  remain  at  pre-
nationalisation levels. 
 
Expectations that the mines under government control would provide more revenues to the state 
proved misplaced. Not only did the cash flow position of the mines deteriorate, but the real copper 
price also fell. Profits were not as high as expected, and must have had serious consequences for 
financing these loans. The result was that, except for a feeling of pride, the nationalisation offered 
small potential short-term gains for the Zambian government, and left it indebted.  
 
It could be argued that the extractive nature of the mining companies before independence allowed 
little  income  to  trickle  down  to  the  Zambian  economy  as  such.  This,  of  course,  provides  no 
justification for the outright nationalisation of the copper mines, because by taxing the mines the 
Zambian government could have received an income to use on development projects in the country. 
If the government had accepted the suggestion by the United Nations and had fixed taxes at a 
nominal rate of 50 percent, for example, it probably would have been the best long-term solution for 
both  the  industry  and  the  country.  The  companies  would  have  remained  in  control  of  the 
management  of  their  properties,  which  was  a  very  important  consideration  for  obtaining  loan 
finance,  and  taxes  would  have  been  at  a  level  that  international  investors  would  have  found 
attractive (Cunningham 1981).  
 
So far in this section the violation of property rights of fixed assets were discussed. Another form of 
property rights violation took place on a more personal level, where human rights were abused. One 
example from Zambia is where people's personal security was threatened in instances where they 
opposed the Kaunda government. Kaunda saw groups opposing his rule as a threat to security and 
this threat therefore justified the use of violence against them. When Kaunda faced the outbreak of 
fighting between Lumpa followers and the police in July 1964, he used force to squash the uprising. 
He had frequently vowed that he would use whatever force was necessary against revolting fellow 
Zambians. For example he told the secession leaders in Barotse Province: “Today I warn, tomorrow  
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I crush”, and repeated these warnings to others who used tribalism and threatened to split Zambia 
(quoted in Pettman 1974: 39). 
 
In Zambia the general increasing interventionism of the state did not arouse undue alarm in the early 
years. It was widely recognised that much needed to be done to make up for the previous gross 
neglect and government was seen as the best vehicle to accomplish this goal. This also happened in 
a period where state intervention was widely accepted as an efficient method to steer the economy in 
a planned direction (Turok 1989).  
 
There  is, however, a difference between steering an economy  and the outright  infringement on 
property rights. Why did the Zambian government infringe on such an important element of the 
institutional framework? Extractive colonialism is part of the answer, with government acting on 
pressure from their constituency to free the country of European influences.  
 
Although a plausible explanation, it does not fully account for their actions. If government deeply 
believed in the protection of property rights it would have considered the future advantages and 
disadvantages of infringement with more caution. The advantages of protected property rights are a 
stable economy, open to international investments. The disadvantages of not acting on the pressure 
from  the  constituency  could  have  been the  decline  in  popularity.  This  disadvantage  can  hardly 
explain government’s actions because if it was scared of losing its majority at the ballot box, if it did 
not respond to pressure from the constituency, it was in any case willing to change the constitution 
to ensure a one-party state, the so-called Second Republic in 1972.  
 
Another  explanation  finds  its  roots  in  the  endurance  of  informal  institutions.  It  was  previously 
claimed that colonisation destroyed old institutions and created new ones, but what were these old 
institutions and did they support the protection of property rights of capital goods and also personal 
property rights? Were they altogether destroyed by colonialism? 
 
In the following section the link between post-colonial policies and the situation that existed in pre-
colonial times will be considered. The reason for this is to establish whether colonialism is indeed 
such an important explanation for post-colonial behaviour. 
 
4. Pre-colonial Zambia 
Present day Zambia consists of seventy-two separate ethnic groups living in nine provinces. They  
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speak a multitude of languages and dialects, but the major ethno-linguistic groups are: the Bemba 
(36.2 percent), Nyanja (17.6 percent), Tonga (15.1 percent), Barotse (8.2 percent) and the north-
western group (10 percent), which includes the Kaonde, Lunda and Luvale speakers. 
 
Before the Europeans drew a border defining the present-day Zambia, the nation’s ethnic groups 
lived in relative isolation from one another for almost four centuries. The groups had no common 
language and were organised politically different from one group to another. Some chiefs were 
major political actors and ruled large kingdoms, while other chiefs were minor officials, little more 
than village headmen. According to Colson (1959), the Tonga, for example, had no chiefs or other 
forms of authority before colonial rule started.  
 
Although these groups lived in close proximity to one another, there was no distinctive binding 
force. For Burdette (1988: 11) it was this “lack of a common political and social history and shared 
institutions”  that  eventually  rendered  these  groups  vulnerable  to  the  European  invasion.  The 
multiple groups in Zambia were unable to create a binding force that was strong enough to withstand 
the British influence.  
 
As a detailed discussion of the politics and authority present in all the different tribes in Zambia at 
the time before colonisation falls outside the scope of this article, the focus will fall primarily on the 
Bemba. There are two reasons for this choice: the Bemba represents the largest single group of 
people in Zambia, and it is also the group in which the first President of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, 
grew up.  
 
Between 1500 and 1800 the Lunda and Luba peoples of Congolese origin settled in the northern, 
eastern, and western parts of Zambia under the leadership of Kazembe. By the end of the eighteenth 
century they came in direct contact with the people that are today known as the Bemba. With the 
two groups specialising in different economic activities, they were able to trade their surpluses. The 
Lunda and Luba mined and smelted copper and iron ore to make ingots for sale to other tribes or 
traders, while the Bemba not only traded salt and ivory, but were even more renowned as slave 
traders (Burdette 1988).  At first  these groups were able to live in harmony, but eventually the 
competition  between  them  brought  them  into  conflict.  Wars  between  them  contributed  to  the 
devastating effects of the slave trade, and by 1870 Kazembe’s kingdom was in serious decline, with 
the Bemba retaining much of their power (Burdette 1988). 
 
The manner in which the political structures developed in pre-colonial Zambia had much to do with  
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their location. The Bemba lived in a well-watered area, where ample rainfall made it possible for 
them to survive in spite of the generally poor soil. They were self-sufficient, subsistence farmers 
who grew their own food, but because of the poverty of the soil they had to move their villages to 
new  locations  every  few  years  (Maday  accessed  July  2004).  No  large  villages  developed  and 
because it was always easy to move to another location, there was no necessity for a political culture 
of cooperation to develop. 
 
In the literature (Simon 1970, Whiteley 1951) the Bemba Paramount Chief is described as a person 
who commands the army, has supreme control of supernatural powers, possesses the most sacred of 
the tribal relics and who has the right of appointment to lesser chiefdoms. The basis of his political 
power and authority is both supernatural and secular. No automatic succession of leaders existed. An 
individual’s heredity determined his eligibility for a legitimate position of authority, but among 
other things he also needed the support of a sufficient number of commoners, military power and 
slaves. 
 
The Bemba chiefs did not possess inheritable wealth. Accumulation of material wealth was not 
regarded as an indication of prestige or power amongst the Bemba. According to Simon (1970) the 
chief’s status depended to a large extent upon how much control he had over his subjects’ means of 
wealth. Maday (accessed July 2004) describes how this situation can be a possible explanation for 
the absence of prominent families in the Bemba culture. No family was able to distinguish itself 
from the others through the accumulation of personal wealth. Furthermore, the chief had no certainty 
that his son would become the next chief and therefore had little incentive to gather belongings 
beyond his basic needs for survival. After his death all his belongings could become the possession 
of the new, possibly unrelated, chief. The important institution of property rights did, therefore, not 
exist in the Bemba culture.  
 
The protection of personal property rights was not institutionalised either, with the Bemba chiefs 
renowned primarily for being efficient slave traders. It created an environment where they lived in 
small, scattered groups, and most people were unaware of the arrival of the British colonialists 
before the process was already in an advanced state. The Bemba and the rest of the Zambian tribes 
were unable to work together due to their previous antagonistic relationship, to resist the British 
influence in their area at colonisation, but were also unable to work in cooperation in a post-colonial 
government. 
 
If the pre-colonial history of Zambia is taken into account, property rights protection was not an  
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institutionalised  practice.  The  Bemba  was  not  accustomed  to  defining  and  protecting  private 
property.  To  nationalise  the  mining  industry  was,  therefore,  not  so  much  in  conflict  with  an 
institutionalised  tradition  of  the  leaders,  and  the  situation  during  colonisation  certainly  did  not 
support its creation. 
 
From the discussion so far it seems as if colonisation does not serve as the sole explanation for post-
colonial infringement on property rights in Zambia. The protection of property rights were not an 
institutionalised  practice  during  pre-colonial  times,  either.  If  one  takes  into  account  that  the 
protection of property is an important element of economic growth, does this mean Zambia was 
doomed for failure,  with  or  without colonisation?  Is  there  hope  for  Zambia  and  countries  with 
similar histories?  
 
From the following discussion it seems that not only the existence of bad institutions, but also the 
pace at which institutional change happens, is detrimental to a country. The problem Zambia had to 
face at independence was a problem of transition happening too rapidly, rather than a problem 
extractive colonisation. If institutional change in Zambia is contrasted with institutional change in, 
for instance Europe, the lack of time to adapt to a new economic and political environment in 
Zambia’s case, is a difference that needs to be highlighted. 
 
5. Institutional change in Zambia 
North (2005: 44) summarises the problem surrounding the pace of institutional change as follows: 
“Problems posed by the transition of a belief system from one constructed to deal with the physical 
environment to one constructed to confront the complex problems of the human environment are at 
the core of the problems of economic development”. With extractive colonisation leaving no room 
for local Zambians to partake in an economy that traded internationally or a political system that 
supported  democratic  institutions,  these  Zambians  suddenly  had  to  make  important  decisions 
regarding  their  economy  after  independence.  They  were  left  with  a  constitution  that  protected 
property rights, without them having a history as such. 
 
What lessons are there to learn for a county like Zambia where the local people had no time to adapt 
gradually from being self-sufficient to an economy that trades internationally, or an economy where 
the chief had no use for private property, to one where property rights are well protected? No one 
can deny that this was an undesirable position to start independence. But in an environment that is 
constantly changing, all countries find it hard to change institutions and implement policies that  
  15
solve the imposed problems.  
 
If growth is the result of an institutional framework that provides the institutional incentives to 
undertake  productivity-raising  activities,  and  stagnation  results  from  disincentives  to  engage  in 
productive activity, the problem to confront is how to end up with a growth-enhancing institutional 
framework. If countries that got it right were only lucky, there is not much to do about economic 
underdevelopment.  And  due  to  the  influence  of  informal  institutions,  successful  policies  from 
developed economies cannot be duplicated in developing countries.  
 
The way to work towards an institutional framework that supports economic growth is to create an 
environment  where  experimentation  and  feedback  is  allowed.  The  more  policymakers  and 
entrepreneurs  can  experiment  with  different  policy  options,  the  better  the  chance  of  survival. 
Entrepreneurs and policymakers must operate in an environment where they can make decisions, get 
feedback and according to the feedback, alter their previous decisions. 
 
In an environment of uncertainty, centralised political control limits the options that are available for 
experimentation.  Authoritarian  rule  during  Zambia’s  Second  Republic  left  almost  no  room  for 
experimentation and feedback. With no opposition parties allowed, a drive to rid the country of 
skilled foreigners and constraints on the press, feedback was severely constrained. Of course, an 
authoritarian ruler dedicated to promoting economic growth has an advantage in the short run. He or 
she can establish conditions supporting economic growth and development in the short run, but a 
crisis, like for instance the fall in the copper price, can undermine the support of the ruler to such an 
extent  that  the  environment  becomes  even  more  unstable.  Consequently,  such  instability  will 
undermine good economic performance.  
 
Due to historical differences rooted in an antagonistic past of tribal conflicts, the various political 
parties had difficulty in working together in a government. This again was met with centralisation of 
power that did not allow for experimentation and feedback. The fall in the price of copper, the main 
source of income in Zambia, created even more uncertainty.  
 
In a world of uncertainty the ever-changing environment requires experimentation to confront new 
challenges. No one knows the right path to survival and the best way to deal with this uncertainty is 
to try different options and to respond to the feedback received. In Zambia’s case instability in the 
economic and political environment led to centralised control by Kaunda. This centralised decision-
making  left  little  room  for  positive  and  negative  feedback  and  the  institutional  change  moved  
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gradually towards stagnation.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Zambia was subjected to extractive colonial rule where little protection was granted to the rights of 
the indigenous population. This can most likely explain the infringement of property rights after 
independence, but it is suggested that the policy patterns after independence could also be traced 
back to pre-colonial institutions.  
 
The biggest tribe in Zambia, and the one to which President Kaunda belonged, had no history of 
gathering  and  protecting  private  property.  Therefore,  although  colonial  rule  in  Zambia  was 
extractive, it cannot be accepted straight away that the situation would have been the opposite if no 
colonisation had taken place. 
 
Negative features of colonialism included its disruptive nature and the fact that it left no room for a 
gradual transformation from a self-sufficient rural society to a society active in modern economic 
activities. The disruption of colonialism was, however, followed by more disruptions in the post-
colonial country. Property rights were infringed upon and the centralisation of power left little room 
for experimentation and feedback in an uncertain environment.  
 
For  economies  to  work  towards  an  institutional  framework  that  consists  of  growth  enhancing 
incentives, trial and error is essential. No one knows what the “right” policy choices are, but through 
feedback and incorporating this feedback in future policy, the country stands a much greater chance 
of developing a growth enhancing institutional framework. Unfortunately, this important element 
was absent in Zambia in the first thirty years after independence. 
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